A bus, the civil war and Lebanon`s lost memory

Remember that little bus that carried Palestinians from West Beirut to their refugee camp in Tel al-Zaatar, East Beirut, on the 13^th of April 1975? The Lebanese civil war officially started on that day when Christian Phalange militiamen shot and killed 27 Palestinians in that bus while they drove through the Christian Ain el-Rummaneh neighbourhood. From that moment on Lebanon entered hell. For almost 15 years.

Bus owner Sami Hamdan, in front of the bus in 2007. (c) AP

On that day I was 15. I lived in Moslem Ras el-Nabeh, West Beirut, close to the frontline opposite Christian Sodeco. My school was the Grand Lycee in nearby Christian Ashrafieh, 10 minutes by bicycle. When the shooting started between Ain el-Rummeneh and Moslen Chiah “our” area suddenly filled with guys totting Kalashnikov machine guns. They took control of the streets and spoke about defeating the pro-Western Phalanges and liberating Palestine. In “their” areas guys carried similar arms and vowed to liberate Lebanon from Palestinians and communists. These Cold War years seem like centuries ago.

I remember burned out public buses, stoned militiamen firing for no reason in the air and a sniper from the other side who from his angle could only hit the Western side of Omar Ben Khattab road where my family home was located. We received 61mm mortar shells, then 120mm mortar shells, then Grad and Katyusha missiles; the other side got similar ones, too. The sound of silence after an explosion was terrifying. The screaming of frightened neighbors or the wounded in streets guaranteed sleepless nights.

I narrowly escaped being kidnapped by the Phalange while cycling to school during a ceasefire in June 1975. From far away I saw them close to the school entrance, took a side road back to Ras El-Nabeh and did not see the school till 1990. This is when I realized that the words “Moslem Shia” in my ID could mean death.  

So many pictures are still engraved in my memory, like the unknown gunmen I saw executing five men, probably Christians, in Bshara el-Khoury road in 1976. Just around the corner, the burned out corpses of kidnapped Christians were neatly lined under the bridge near Berbir Hospital. The other side dumped the copses of kidnapped Moslems under other bridges. Since then, I just do not like bridges.

Off course, the war did not start out of the blue with the bus massacre 31 years ago on the 13^th of April. The civil war has its roots in a sectarian system formulated by the French mandate power in the 1920s, in the screaming inequalities between rich and poor, in Palestinians being robbed of their homeland and in the inability of Lebanese to unite, refuse foreign interference and solve their problems with non-violent means.

So insanity lasted almost 15 years and officially ended in October 1990. The result: About  150,000 people killed, many more injured and maimed, one million internally displaced and many more in emigration. Beirut’s city center was destroyed, the infrastructure shattered, forests burnt, the coastline dotted with open waste dumps. But phoenix superficially rose from the ashes and the country was quickly rebuilt. Economically, that is. Beirut became the Arab city to live in. Mega cool, sexy and just fun. That is if you forget the mass poverty in many areas, especially in North Lebanon.

Divisions, divisions and more divisions

21 years after the end of the civil war – one whole generation later – Lebanon is as divided as in 1975. The main fault lines: 

_ Sunni Moslems blame the Shia Hezbollah militia for killing former Sunni Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 with an international UN tribunal to issue indictments soon. Expect a Sunni-Shia confrontation in one way or another. 

_ Christian Maronites are more divided then ever between pro- and anti-Hezbollah. Syria’s and Iran’s dictatorial regimes arm Hezbollah, a state in the state of Lebanon, to pressure Israel and the West. 

_ Prime Minister-designate Najib Mikati, Hezbollah`s and Syria's  choice, is unable to form a cabinet. 

The country is in a mess and could blow up any minute.

Despite a general atmosphere of gloom and doom Lebanese youth groups launched early 2011 an anti-sectarianism movement, inspired by uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and other Arab states. It started well with more and more people participating in sit-ins and demonstrations, but the movement got bogged down because of internal divisions and a lack of strategy. The Shia Amal movement tried to hijack the movement and supported abolishing the sectarian system, reviving a deep-rooted Christian Maronite angst. The Phalange accused Amal of seeking to establish the rule of the demographically largest religious communities (Sunni and Shia) over Christians. Back to square one, 13^th April 1975.

Anti-sectarianism demonstration, Beirut, 10 April 2011

The Taef Accord, superficial peace with no reconciliation

Lebanon did not recover from the civil war because the 1989 Taef accord, which ended the all-out shooting a year later, did not end the mistrust among the communities and political factions. It just made cosmetic changes to a sectarian system that guaranteed warlords from all sides a well-defined piece of the big pie called Lebanon. The Christians then lost some privileges and had to share the pie 50-50 with Moslems, instead of 60-40. In principle not much changed: Institutions were kept weak, corruption grew, Palestinians were still armed in their camps because they trusted no one and almost all Lebanese politicians kept relying on foreign backers in Riyadh and Washington or in Damascus and Tehran.

Add to this the fact that some main points of the Taef accord were never implemented. All militias were disarmed expect Hezbollah which fought Israeli occupation in the South, but kept its arms after the Israeli withdrawal in May 2000 – in line with the regional interests of Syria and Iran. Syrian troops did not withdraw as stipulated in the accord, but were forced out after mass demonstrations in 2005. The Taef accord said, “Abolishing political secterianism is a fundamental national objective. To achieve it, it is required that efforts be made in accordance with a phased plan”. This was never seriously tackled by the political class.

The worst part of the Lebanese history is that parliament, controlled by the warlords, passed in 1991 an amnesty for crimes committed during the war. This "amnesia law" is one major cause for the many wars and internal disturbances Lebanon has been going through since 1990. Lebanon never had a true national reconciliation process. Beside one brave former top-level militiaman, Assaad Chaftari from the Christian Lebanese Forces, no militia leader genuinely apologized for his crimes. No one asked the victims and their families for forgiveness. No one said where missing people are buried.

Allow me to name the warlords who are today still in powerful positions: Nabih Berri (Shia/Amal), Walid Jumblatt (Druze/Progressive Socialist Party), Amine Gemayel (Maronite/Phalange), Samir Geagea (Maronite/Lebanese Forces), Michel Aoun (Maronite/former Army commander). Hesbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, who came to power after the civil war, followed their path by igniting a senseless war with Israel in 2006 (some 1,300 dead Lebanese). In May 2008 he sent his gunmen to storm West Beirut and the Chuf mountains (100-200 killed). Today, Hezbollah arms are used to threaten Shia opposing Hezbollah and all other sects.

National reconciliation as a prelude for real peace

How can the Lebanese prevent another April 13 with devastating consequences? How can this divided nation unite for a true peace process? I believe that political steps must be taken to set up a truth finding process leading to a true national reconciliation. 

The group al-Muqawimoun warning with 

a banner, "The bus (war) is waiting around the corner".

The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) believes that effective transitional justice must include several measures complementing one another. “Without any truth-telling or reparation efforts, for example, punishing a small number of perpetrators can be viewed as a form of political revenge. Truth-telling, in isolation from efforts to punish abusers and to make institutional reforms, can be viewed as nothing more than words. Reparations that are not linked to prosecutions or truth-telling may be perceived as ‘blood money’ – an attempt to buy the silence or acquiescence of victims. Similarly, reforming institutions without any attempt to satisfy victims' legitimate expectations of justice, truth and reparation, is not only ineffective from the standpoint of accountability, but unlikely to succeed in its own terms”.

“Transitional justice should be designed to strengthen democracy and peace – the key goals for societies picking up the pieces after periods of mass abuse,” ICTJ notes. “These goals are more likely to be reached with active consultation of, and participation by, victims groups and the public... A holistic approach implies taking into account the full range of factors that may have contributed to abuse”.

But what are the conditions we need in Lebanon to set up a national reconciliation process? How can we get the former warlords to admit, apologize and at least retire from politics once and for all? Do we have to wait until the Syrian regime collapses under the current pressure from a pro-democracy movement all over the country? This would definitely not amuse Hezbollah as it would lose its political and military hinterland – and then feel threatened. 

I think the solution may be in an anti-sectarianism movement that is well organized and which has a clear strategy. This movement should be able to alleviate fears in each sect and mobilize all the Lebanese for a truly democratic society where religion and state are separated. A dream, I know. One great slogan could be “A-sha3eb yourid isqat zu3ama al-taefiyeh”, in English, “The people want to topple the sectarian leaders!”

The bus at "Hangar", April 2011. (c) Soha Menassa

Back to the small bus that brings back so many bad memories. Memory and memorialisation play a crucial role in a national reconciliation process. Umam Research and Development, a Lebanese NGO in Beirut’s southern suburbs, is currently working on a database of people that went missing during the civil war. Its staff recently rescued the bus from disappearance and hauled it into the “Hangar”, Umam’s exhibition hall, where it is now the center piece of an exhibition. Go see it. We should never forget this bus.

Fouad Hamdan is an independent Arab pro-democracy activist who established and headed Greenpeace Lebanon in 1994-1999 and was the founding executive director of the Arab Human Rights Fund in 2008-2010.